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The property division section of the 1970 version of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act was the model for the property division provi-
sions in the 1974 Missouri divorce reform act.' The concept of "marital
property," which is subject to division upon dissolution of marriage, was
a strange beast to Missouri attorneys and judges at the time of the pas-
sage of the new dissolution law. However, in the four years since the
enactment of the statute, there has been significant development of the
definition of marital property in Missouri.
Most appellate litigation has involved two issues stemming from the
requirement that marital property be divided: the definition of "prop-
erty," and the effect of variations in the process of "acquiring" property.
The purpose of this article is to explore the resolution of these two is-
sues. That exploration should be more instructive after a brief consider-
ation of the statute's theory and the court's role in its implementation.
PURPOSE AND THEORY
Application of the property division section of the statute to prop-
erty acquired prior to the Act's passage in 1974 has been held constitu-
tionally permissible because of the reasonable public policy to be
served-the elimination of "the patent inequity" and "rancorous after-
math" resulting under the previous law.2 The court in Corder v. Corder
pointed out that under the former law, whether property was titled
solely in the husband or in both spouses, the contributions of the
* © 1978, Joan M. Krauskopf.
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1. Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). Compare §
452.330, RSMo (Supp. 1975) with UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307.
Krauskopf, A Theory for 'Just" Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 165 (1976); V.M. v. L.M., 526 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975);
Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
2. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
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spouses, including the contribution of the homemaker's services, had
been largely ignored. The interests in such property were regimented by
operation of law which "due to its inherent inflexibility, made it impossi-
ble to accommodate any consideration of what might be a just or fair
division." 3 The unity of possession in which the parties were left when
property had been titled in both names continued rather than alleviated
the acrimony and discord between the parties after dissolution of their
marriage. The Corder court stated:
The Dissolution of Marriage Act views the acquisition of 'mari-
tal property' as a partnership endeavor, and it enunciates a
standard for dividing such property which is flexible enough to
weigh and balance the respective contributions of the spouses
and to accommodate consideration of manifest justness and
fairness. It appears that an additional goal ... was to eliminate
any carryover of the animosity which brought about the sever-
ance of the marriage. 4
That the purpose of the legislation was to allow a fair division of
property based on the theory of marriage as a partnership was also
clearly enunciated by the court in In re Marriage of Cornell.5 In an ear-
lier article this writer attempted to document that the intention of the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws in drafting the property division sec-
tion was to adopt the partnership theory of the community property
states for purposes of division of property at dissolution.6 The thesis of
that article was that the partnership theory should be a guiding principle
in determining a 'just" division of marital property. Both the statements
of the Corder and Cornell courts and the citation of cases from commu-
nity property jurisdictions in other Missouri opinions 7 indicates that the
Missouri courts also have accepted the Commissioners' adoption of
community property theory as a guiding principle for determining the
nature of marital property. The instant article will analyze the interests
that could be characterized as "marital" property on the basis of that
same community property concept-that marriage is a partnership
during which the time and industry of both spouses are devoted to the
furtherance of the marital unit.
OBLIGATION, POWER, AND DISCRETION
The appellate courts in Missouri have held that the court's obliga-
tion to divide marital property upon dissolution of marriage is manda-
3. Id. at 803.
4. Id. at 804-05.
5. 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
6. Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 166.
7. Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Cain v. Cain,
536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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tory.8 The Corder opinion held that to effect a just division and to avoid
a carryover of the animosity that caused the dissolution, the statute in-
exorably commands the trial court in a dissolution proceeding to divide
the marital property and to sever all common ownership between the
spouses, unless the unusual economics of the situation call for continua-
tion.9
Original doubts about the trial court's power to fashion orders to
effectuate property division have been dispelled by decisions upholding
a wide variety of orders. Those decisions recognize that the legislature
was wise to leave unspecified the powers necessary to deal with the great
diversity of property interests that must be divided.' In Claunch v.
Claunch " the court upheld an order granting all of the couple's meager
property to one party and requiring that party to pay half the property's
value in cash to the other, even though no cash existed. The court held
that the statutory phrase "divide the marital property" includes the pow-
ers necessary to render effective the power to divide. In Beckman v.
Beckman 12 a cash award to one party with deferred payments without
interest was approved. A number of decisions have approved orders for
sale of the family residence after the children reach majority with a
stated percentage of the proceeds to be paid each party.' 3 Orders for
one party to pay debts owed by the couple also have been approved as
proper in connection with division of property.' 4
Numerous appellate opinions have noted that the division of marital
property need not be equal15 and that the theory of partnership or
8. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Davis v.
Davis, 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); L.F.H. v. R.L.H., 543 S.W.2d
520 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
9. Although neither party appealed from the dissolution itself, the trial
court had entered a decree that only granted the dissolution. The court of ap-
peals held that "the decree entered by the trial court did not constitute a division
of 'marital property' ... and for that reason was not a final judgment and order,
and was not appealable. Appeal dismissed." 546 S.W.2d at 806. The implication
was that the marriage is not dissolved until an order is entered which divides the
marital property or approves a separation agreement which disposes of the mar-
ital property. That result is in keeping with the aim of the divorce reform
movement to insure fair economic settlements before granting freedom from the
marital state. See Krauskopf, supra note 1, at 170; Krauskopf, Maintenance: Theory
and Negotiation, 33 J. Mo. B. 24 (1977).
10. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
11. 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
12. 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
13. Ortmann v. Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In re
Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
14. In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
15. Ortmann v. Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In re
Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Conrad v. Bowers,
533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975); In re Marriage of Powers, 527
S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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"team effort" requires recognition that both partners' efforts contribute
to the acquisition of marital property."; However, the limited standard
of review enunciated in Murphy v. Carron 17 has resulted in few reversals
for improper division of the property. Apparently, the only decisions
which reversed a division of property for abuse of discretion are In re
Marriage of Cornell,'8 Cain v. Cain,'9 In re Marriage of Schulte,20 and In re
Marriage of Carmack.2 1 Each of these cases involved an undervaluation
of the wife-homemaker's contribution and economic need. In re Marriage
of Galloway 22 was reversed for the court's failure to consider physical
abuse under the "conduct" factor in section 452.330.1(4), RSMo (Supp.
1975).
CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY
In holding that a contract for a deed constituted property, the court
in Claunch v. Claunch 23 noted that the divorce reform act does not define
"property," but that Section 1.020, RSMo 1969 provides:
As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise spe-
cially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the
legislature or the context thereof:
(8) 'Personal property' includes money, goods, chattels, things
in action, and evidence of debt; ... (11) 'Property' includes real
and personal property; (12) 'Real property' or 'premises' or
'real estate' or 'lands' is coextensive with lands, tenements, and
hereditaments; ... 24
The court further quoted from American Jurisprudence:
In 63 Am. Jur. 2d 291 Property § 4, it is said: "Thus the term
'property' is sufficiently comprehensive to include every species
of estate, real and personal, and everything which one person
can owh and transfer to another. It extends to every species of
right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such, upon which
it is practicable to place a money value." 25
Even under such comprehensive definitions of property, litigation has
arisen concerning subtle interests of importance to the parties.
16. In re Marriage of Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); In re Marriage of
Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544
S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
17. 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
18. 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
19. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
20. 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
21. 550 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
22. 547 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
23. 525 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
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Tangible Assets, Business Interests, and Valuation
What one may term the layman's notion of property has been well
represented in division of property: cash, bank accounts, real estate,
household furniture, tools, farm equipment, and motor vehicles. A just
division of even these simple forms of property may be difficult when
values have not been established. However, one must recognize that the
cost of establishing values utilizing expert witnesses and substantial at-
torney time often could exceed the value of the interests being litigated.
For this reason, it is wise that the Missouri appellate courts have not
required trial courts to value all property in litigation. However, attor-
neys should make a conscientious effort to decide which items warrant
detailed evidence of value. For example, in Cain v. Cain 2 6 the wife's evi-
dence indicated that a piece of the husband's separate property which
was paid for during marriage was worth about $565,000; the husband
presented no countervailing evidence. Because the statute requires
consideration of the separate property of each spouse in determining
proper division of marital property,27 this uncontradicted evidence may
account for the appellate court's grant of substantially more marital
property to the wife. 2 8 The opinion in Butcher v. Butcher 2 9 implied that
the only testimony concerning the value of well over a million dollars
worth of property came from the parties themselves. In either case valu-
ations by the best available experts might have resulted in a difference in
value of over one hundred thousand dollars.
The Missouri courts easily dispatched decisions which held that
shares of stock, including those from employee stock option plans, are
property subject to division. 30  Other slightly more sophisticated inter-
ests have been determined as property: cash value of life insurance; 3 '
contract for a deed; 32 interests in trusts and remainders after life inter-
ests of others; 3 3 debts owed to the couple; 34 and debts owed to one of
the parties. 35 Missouri courts have not yet ruled on contingent fee con-
tracts, but other jurisdictions have included such contracts in marital
property.3
6
26. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
27. § 452.330.1(2), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
28. Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
29. 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
30. Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Ortmann v.
Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In re Marriage of Dodd,
532 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); In re Marriage of Powers, 527
S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
31. In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
32. Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
33. Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
34. Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
35. Id.
36. Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946); Due v. Due,
331 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 1977). But see Lockett v. Lockett, 558 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.
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Although one abortive attempt to divide the property of a close cor-
poration was reversed,3 7 there seems to have been little difficulty in
characterizing most business interests as property subject to division, in-
cluding sole proprietorships,3 8 partnership interests,39 and shares in a
close corporation.40 The difficulty in these cases is one of valuation. In
In re Marriage of Neubern 41 no value at all was placed on a liquor busi-
ness, and in In re Marriage of Vanet 42 apparently only the office furniture
of a law practice was included in its value. In Butcher v. Butcher the hus-
band's interest in a real estate partnership developing land near the
Kansas City International Airport was valued unrealistically on the basis
of the husband's original investment because no other evidence of value
was introduced. 43  Valuation of shares in a close corporation has
plagued all three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals.4 4
A major valuation problem stems from the fact that there is no
market from which to establish the value of a sole proprietorship, a
partnership interest, or shares in a close corporation. A partnership
agreement, the corporation by-laws, or a buy-sell agreement among the
shareholders of the close corporation might include a formula for de-
termining the value of a partner's or a shareholder's interest. Such
agreements can be conditioned to control at the retirement or death of a
shareholder or partner or in case of a sale of the interest. When the
condition occurs, courts ordinarily have held that the agreement controls
over any other mode of valuation. 45 In Stern v. Stern 46 the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered the issue of valuing a prominent attorney's
App., D. St. L. 1977) (amount of retainer contract conditioned on service not
income).
37. V.M. v. L.M., 526 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
38. In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); In re
Marriage of Neubern, 535 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
39. Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); In re
Marriage of Simpelo, 542 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Nixon v. Nixon,
525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
40. In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
Beckman v. Beckman, 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Butcher v.
Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Naeger v. Naeger, 542
S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App.,
D. Spr. 1976); In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975).
41. 535 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
42. 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
43. 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
44. In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
Beckman v. Beckman, 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Butcher v.
Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
45. Powell v. Kennedy, 463 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. En Banc 1971); 2 F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.24 (1971); cases collected in Annot., 54 A.L.R. 3d 790
(1974).
46. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
[Vol. 43
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/1
MARITAL PROPERTY
interest in his law partnership for purposes of property division at mar-
riage dissolution. Although the court recognized that any evidence rele-
vant to value would be admissible, it held that the figure reached by
applying the formula in the partnership agreement for calculating a
partner's interest payable at death could be used as the presumptive
value of his interest.
In the absence of an agreed formula to value such business interests,
evidence should be produced from which an estimate of the net value of
the assets acquired and the earning power developed during the mar-
riage can be made. A host of evidence is relevant ranging from accepted
formulae for taxation purposes to rules of thumb among those who deal
in a specific kind of business. From the sparse references to valuation in
Missouri cases it is evident that confusion abounds among lawyers and
judges as to sound valuation methods.
It is generally agreed that "book value" is not an accurate method of
valuing assets; book value simply reflects the particular method that a
business and its accountants have chosen to state its financial condi-
tion.47 Most often it reflects acquisition cost of assets less depreciation
determined according to a formula for tax purposes. The actual value of
assets in the sense of fair market value or what they would bring at sale
may be far greater or less than book value.48 Consequently, use of book
value in the valuation of shares is questionable. O'Neal has said that in
some respects book value "is one of the most unsatisfactory ways of de-
termining the value of shares. The book value of corporate assets is an
unreliable guide to the true worth of a going business, and consequently
the book value of corporate shares is an unreliable standard by which to
determine their worth." 49 O'Neal also emphasized that the value of
goodwill almost never is shown on corporate books. This further adds to
the unreliability of using book value as a guide to worth of shares.
In Naeger v. Naeger5 0 the court seemed to accept statements of net
worth on income tax returns as evidence of the value of the corporation.
The figures used for tax purposes are nearly always book value figures.
47. Lassallette v. Parisian Baking Co., 110 Cal. App. 2d 375, 242 P.2d 671
(1952); Myers, The Close Corporation in Estate Planning, 23 J. Mo. B. 480 (1967);
cases collected in Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 606 (1957).
48. B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974);
Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1966); A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING
AND MERGING BUSINESSES 51 (1969); Blackstone, Robinson, Harvey & Shiach,
How to Put a Price on a Close Corporation, 22 DIG. OF TAX ART. 43 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Blackstone].
49. F. O'NEAL, supra note 45, § 7.24a at 86.
50. 542 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976). In Lockett v. Lockett, 558
S.W.2d 387 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977), neither the parties nor the court ques-
tioned book value as the basis for valuing shares in an employment agency. As
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In fact, the use of depreciation deductions to offset income for tax pur-
poses is one of the main factors in making book value an unrealistic
measure. In In re Marriage of Schulte 51 the Springfield District of the
court of appeals repeatedly referred to two different values for the close
corporation shares in question, one of which was book value. Because
the court concluded that the award was inadequate even using the
higher value figure, it did not have to resolve the issue of relevance of
book value. The court could have saved itself trouble and given guid-
ance to attorneys by explaining the weakness of book value. In Butcher v.
Butcher 51 the court stated that it used the original investment cost (book
value) to value a partnership interest because no other evidence was in-
troduced. The other evidence, of course, would have been that the value
of the real estate which was the partnership's main asset had greatly
appreciated.
Seldom does the net asset value of a business accurately measure its
worth. In most operating businesses, earning power may be a more ac-
curate measure of the value of the business. One author has said: "Most
authorities now agree that, except in special cases, valuation of industrial
companies should be based on earnings. Assets are of importance only
because they produce income. The more income produced, the greater
their value." 53 The usual method of valuation averages earnings 54 for
the preceding five to ten years to determine earning capacity. To pro-
duce a current value figure, the historical earning power is capitalized by
multiplying that figure by a rate determined by the probability that
earnings will continue. The capitalization multiple varies with the risk as
to future earnings. This multiple is the reciprocal of the rate of return a
willing buyer would want from his investment in purchasing the busi-
ness. If the risk is high, a prospective buyer would expect a higher rate
of return on his money. For example, if a purchaser would demand a
twenty percent return on money invested in a certain type of business,
he would be willing to invest an amount equal to five times average
earnings.
"Without doubt, the most difficult part of valuation is choosing the
appropriate capitalization rate." 55 An established business with sub-
stantial assets, stable management, and a place in a growing area of the
economy would be accorded the highest rate, with a value of perhaps
ten times earnings. Risks due to the type of business, management
problems, market conditions, and condition of assets and liabilities will
51. 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
52. 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
53. A. CHOreA, supra note 48, at 51.
54. In the case of a sole proprietorship or a partnership, an amount for
reasonable salary for the services of the proprietor or partner must be deducted
from the "earnings" before capitalization.
55. A. CHOKA, supra note 48, at 53.
[Vol. 43
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/1
MARITAL PROPERTY
decrease the rate. O'Neal has stated that for most small businesses in
normal times the rate will be about five times earnings.56 Use of the
capitalization of earnings valuation method requires expert witnesses on
all factors affecting the condition of the business and its markets. 57
However, this may not be as difficult as it seems. In addition to profes-
sional appraisers, other experts may be available, including officers in
investment firms or banks financing a certain type of business or persons
engaged in buying and selling businesses of a certain type. Such experts
are able to make relevant comparison valuations because of their experi-
ence with similar businesses. Commonly used evidence is the price-
earnings ratio of the publicly traded stock of companies considered
comparable to the one in question.58 There is often an industry-wide
norm for the price-earnings ratio.
In Schulte '9 capitalization of earnings apparently was utilized as the
valuation method by the accountant who audited the company's books
and testified concerning the shares' value. The appellate opinion indi-
cated that he arrived at a value estimate of five or six dollars a share by
taking into account factors such as continuity of management and then
multiplying earnings by a factor of ten or twelve.
Straight capitalization valuation may be highly misleading in a close
corporation which has paid large salaries with resultant low corporate
earnings. Therefore, it has been suggested that this is not a desirable
method of setting the value of shares in a close corporation. 60 Straight
capitalization also would be an unrealistic method to value an interest in
a corporation in which the tangible assets are exceedingly valuable but
the annual earnings are minimal. In Beckman v. Beckman 61 asset value
rather than capitalization was used to determine the value of shares in a
family farm corporation. Unless there had been exceptionally high
earnings, this is probably the more accurate method for that corpora-
tion.
In the 1920's the I.R.S. approved a split capitalization valuation
method (referred to in tax jargon as the A.R.M. 34 formula) which com-
bines features of both asset valuation and earnings capitalization. 62
Later Revenue Rulings have emphasized that all other relevant factors
also must be considered, 63 but all factors can be considered using the
56. F. O'NEAL, supra note 45, § 7.24d at 94. Cf STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
(1975) 4460.2995.
57. Schwingle, Valuation of Closely Held Stocks, 100 TR. & EST. 555 (1961).
58. Blackstone, supra note 48, at 50.
59. 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
60. F. O'NEAL, supra note 45, § 7.24d at 94.
61. 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
62. Blackstone, supra note 48, at 46; Cohan, Valuation of Interests in Closely
Held Businesses, 46 TR. BULL. 13, 18 (1966).
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A.R.M. 34 formula as a starting point. The first step is a calculation of
past average earnings over several years and average net adjusted value
of tangible assets over the same period of time. A reasonable rate of
return on the assets (between five and ten percent) is then subtracted
from the average earnings figure. The resulting figure is the excess
earnings over a fair return on the value of the net tangible assets. This is
the portion of earning power often described as goodwill or return on
intangible assets. This earning power is capitalized at a determined rate.
The capitalization rate ought to be determined according to the proba-
bility of earnings continuing in the future as evidenced by a considera-
tion of all relevant factors.
The value of the business is a combination of the net tangible asset
value and the intangible earning power value. The virtue of this valua-
tion approach is that it provides separate values for tangible assets, in-
tangible assets, and for the business as a whole.64 For a close corpora-
tion the value of shares is determined by dividing the total number of
shares into the final value of the corporation. The final adjustment of
share value requires a consideration whether the shares of a close corpo-
ration held by a particular individual represent a controlling interest.
The actual value of each share will be less if held by someone other than
the controlling shareholder. 65  In Beckman v. Beckman 66 the trial court
valued a one-quarter interest in a family farming corporation as one-
quarter of the value of the tangible assets. However, there was no evi-
dence that a one-quarter interest was controlling. Therefore, this valua-
tion probably was high because nothing was deducted to account for the
owner's lack of control of the assets.
Professional Earning Capacity or Goodwill
A troublesome characterization problem that has arisen with in-
creasing frequency in jurisdictions where marital property is subject to
division is whether professional earning capacity or goodwill should be
recognized as property. This issue has not been resolved in Missouri.
The problem is most acute in those marriages in which the wife was
employed to enable the husband to obtain his professional education,
usually a medical or law degree. Because the wife of a professional per-
son usually ceases outside employment when her husband's career is suc-
cessfully launched so that she may fulfill the role of professional wife
and mother, her earning capacity will have diminished drastically in
comparison to his. Therefore, a court properly may award the wife a
substantial share of the marital assets acquired with the husband's earn-
64. F. O'NAL, supra note 45, § 7.24f at 97.
65. Schwingle, supra note 57, at 557; Blackstone, supra note 48, at 46.
66. 545 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
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ing capacity in order to recognize her direct contribution to his educa-
tion and to equalize their economic circumstances. 67
If the professional has practiced for some time prior to the marriage
dissolution and the couple has acquired substantial assets from his earn-
ings, the question whether to classify his earning capacity as an asset is
likely to be bypassed as it was in In re Marriage of Vanet.68 The court
approved a property division which could be analyzed as awarding
twenty-six percent of the marital property to the husband and seventy-
four percent to the wife; the husband's earning capacity was not charac-
terized as an independent asset. The court spoke of the justification for
this lopsided division:
The record discloses that the wife was the principal "breadwin-
ner" after the marriage while the husband completed his legal
education and that she continued working and contributed to
the family income until the advent of the first child in 1963.
The financial contribution made by the wife towards the hus-
band's legal education was of inestimable value with respect to
acquisition of the marital property.... The "economic cir-
cumstances" of the wife at the time the marital property was
divided were far less desirable than were those of the husband
since he possessed the earning power of a lawyer while she pos-
sessed only the earning power of a secretary of limited skill.69
The situation not yet resolved is the claim that earning capacity itself
is an asset acquired during the marriage. Such a claim most likely will be
made when there is little or no other marital property. An example is
Magruder v. Magruder, a Nebraska case which involved a doctor who at-
tended the University of Missouri Medical School while his wife taught
in Missouri public schools. The court noted that it was the husband who
wanted the divorce just as the couple was reaching the stage in life when
they could reap the economic rewards of their investment in his educa-
tion. Although the court purported to classify the husband's earning
ability as an asset, it did not attempt to place a value on that earning
capacity. The court recompensed the wife with an order of $100,000
alimony payable over ten years conditioned on her not remarrying.70 A
number of appellate opinions have loosely referred to earning ability as
an asset 7 1 and have approved its consideration in dividing property or
67. §§ 452.330.1(1), .1(3), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
68. 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
69. Id. at 241.
70. 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
71. Moss v. Moss, 549 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1976); Brueggemann v.
Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); Wheeler v. Wheeler,
193 Neb. 615, 228 N.W.2d 594 (1975); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458,
185 N.E.2d 773 (1961); Krauskopf, Applying the Maintenance Statute, 33 J. Mo. B.
100 (1977). See also Conrad v. Conrad, 471 P.2d 893 (Okla. 1970).
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awarding maintenance. However, only in the Oklahoma case of Diment v.
Diment 72 is it clear that earning capacity developed during the marriage
was the basis of a payment as a division of property. The wife in Diment
supported the husband from the eleventh grade through medical school
and there was no other marital property to divide. The court held the
wife's remarriage did not end the husband's obligation to pay the sum
ordered.
In Stern v. Stern 73 the New Jersey Supreme Court also dealt with a
situation in which there was a dearth of tangible or intangible assets to
be divided; the husband, however, partially due to the efforts of the wife
and the influence of her father, had become a prominent attorney
earning more than $130,000 annually. The lower court had squarely
held that the husband's "potential to earn" was property and had
awarded the wife $10,000 a year for ten years as her share. The su-
preme court reversed, stating that potential earning capacity is a factor
to consider in making equitable distribution but is not a separate item of
property. In Todd v. Todd 74 a California court refused to characterize a
professional education as an asset because it could not be assigned a
monetary value. It is likely that the perceived difficulties of evaluation is
also the reason the Stern decision did not classify earning capacity as an
asset. Other than the cost of acquiring the education, valuing a profes-
sional education actually would be valuing the earning capacity acquired
through that education. An article criticizing Todd asserted that either
the cost of the education or a valuation of earning ability similar to that
used in wrongful death cases could suffice to arrive at a reasonable
monetary figure.7 5 A fair interest in this topic suggests that it may have
to be resolved in Missouri in the near future. 76 In the meantime, an
estimate of future earning capacity certainly would be relevant under the
Missouri statute as an economic circumstance relating to just distribution
of other property77 or relating to reasonable needs and ability to pay for
maintenance purposes.
7 8
72. 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1974).
73. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
74. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
75. Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10
CALIF. W.L. REv. 590 (1974).
76. Part of the movement for women's rights may account for a growing
demand that the investment which an employed wife has put into her husband's
professional education should not be lost by his decision to end the marriage just
when he is about to reap its rewards in earnings. Id. It has been argued that
investment in human capital during marriage should be recognized and can be
valued for purposes of property division. R. Combs, The Development of a Set
of Propositional Guidelines and Their Implementation for Use in Decision
Making at Dissolution of Marriage in Indiana (May 1977) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation at Purdue University).
77. § 452.330.1(3), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
78. §§ 452.335.1(1), .2(6), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
(Vol. 43168
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/1
MARITAL PROPERTY
The recognition, valuation, and division of "professional goodwill"
as an asset has been more common than recognition of earning capacity.
In the community property states of California 7 9 and Washington,8 0 de-
cisions have classified the goodwill of a professional practice as property,
pointing out that "the practice of an attorney, physician, or other profes-
sional person may include such an element, even though the goodwill in
such instances is personal in nature and not a readily marketable com-
modity." 81
The goodwill of a normal commercial venture is .the earning power
in excess of a normal rate of return on assets, the measure of which was
discussed above. Because tangible assets ordinarily play a minimal part in
the practice of a profession, courts dealing with professional goodwill
prefer to define it as the "expectation of continued public patron-
age." 8 2
In the community property states the only property subject to divi-
sion is that acquired during the marriage; therefore, these jurisdictions
have made it clear that only professional goodwill existing at the time of
dissolution can be divided.8 3 The Texas Supreme Court, however, re-
fused to recognize goodwill in a professional practice. The court said
that goodwill could not exist apart from the person and what he does in
the future.8 4 A Washington court in Marriage of R.M. Lukens 8 5 criticized
this result in a case involving a medical doctor who practiced in Tacoma.
The trial court valued the tangible assets and accounts receivable of his
practice at $55,800 and the goodwill at $60,000. The appellate court
affirmed this valuation and stated that the present existence of goodwill
could be demonstrated by visualizing the effect on the doctor's practice
if he moved to a different locality. The continued expectation of busi-
ness at his present location was stated to have value despite its unmar-
ketability.
When faced with the issue of valuing goodwill, the California and
Washington courts have been adamant that only a presently existing
79. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93; 113 Cal. Rptr. 58
(Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital
Dissolution, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 186 (1975).
80. Marriage of R.M. Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
81. 558 P.2d at 281.
82. 558 P.2d at 280; In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
83. In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915,
918 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See also In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577,
117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481,
558 P.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1976).
84. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
85. 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279, 282 (1976).
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value is to be measured. The California court in In re Marriage of Foster
stated:
[G]oodwill may not be valued by any method that takes into
account the post-marital efforts of either spouse but . . . a
proper means of arriving at the value of such goodwill con-
templates any legitimate method of evaluation that measures its
present value by taking into account some past result.86
A number of the accepted formulae for valuing commercial goodwill
seems to do just that. In Foster the court approved three of those for-
mulae as legitimate methods of valuation. The formulae included: past
net income of the business for one year less reasonable salary multiplied
by a capitalization figure from two to ten; average net earnings over a
specified period of time; and three months charges or receipts on ac-
counts receivable. Without inquiry as to how the capitalization multiple
was chosen, the court accepted these formulae as "present value"
methods.87
A certain amount of fictionalization is involved in arriving at a pres-
ent value of the expectation of future patronage while at the same time
forbidding consideration of future efforts. It seems that the only valua-
tion methods that do not utilize evidence of individual future prospects
are those applying a capitalization multiple derived either from the
I.R.S., from retirement or buy-sell agreements, or from guidelines in the
industry or profession. In In re Marriage of Lopez 8 and Marriage of R.M.
Lukens 8 9 similar formulae appear to have been used, but the courts also
pointed out that relevant factors to consider were the practitioner's age,
health, past earning power, reputation in the community for skill and
knowledge, and his comparative professional success. Undoubtedly, these
factors are relevant to the determination of the capitalization multiple
because that figure represents a judgment regarding the likelihood of
future earnings continuing as in the past. To this extent, even these
courts have utilized estimates of future earning potential in arriving at a
present value of goodwill. One writer concluded that these courts' failure
to provide definitive guidelines leaves them receptive to any reasonable,
fair, and equitable approach for valuing professional goodwill upon
marital dissolution."
In the common law states, Stern v. Stern 91 is likely to become a
leading case for its forthright rejection of individual earning capacity but
acceptance of professional goodwill as an asset acquired during marriage
and subject to division upon dissolution. The court acknowledged that
86. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 54 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
87. Id. at 585, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
88. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
89. 558 P.2d at 281.
90. Comment, supra note 79, at 186, 205.
91. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
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determining the worth of goodwill presents difficulties but held, that if
goodwill does exist, it should be included among marital assets. 92 Valu-
ation of goodwill was simplified in Stern by use of a partnership agree-
ment. The court approved using the formula in the husband's law
partnership agreement for calculating a partner's interest payable upon
his death as the method for valuing the husband's interest in the
partnership for purposes of property division. It was noted that "a fixed
sum appearing after the partner's name on a schedule appended to the
partnership agreement ... is obviously intended to reflect those ele-
ments of partnership worth other than the member's capital ac-
count." 3 The amount appearing after the husband's name was
$167,000. The court held that that sum plus the value of his capital
account could be used "as the presumptive value of defendant's partner-
ship interest in the firm." 94 The court recognized that this figure could
be challenged as not reflective of true value, but, in the absence of other
evidence, took the amount payable upon death as representing the hus-
band's share of the goodwill of the partnership.
To the extent that a present value exists which was developed by
practicing a profession during the marriage, classifying professional
goodwill as an asset appears justified because recognized valuation
methods can be used to arrive at a monetary figure for division. How-
ever, a caution is warranted. In Stern not only did the wife succeed in
having goodwill included as an asset, but she won affirmance of an
alimony order for $36,000 a year. Great care should be taken in such
cases to insure that the husband does not pay twice. If his future earning
ability is considered by the court in determining division of property or
maintenance, then it is essential that the professional goodwill asset be
valued only at its present value.
Rights Under Retirement Plans
The most valuable asset possessed by an average couple in a long
term marriage may be the husband's rights to retirement pay built up
over as many as twenty-five years of employment during which the tra-
ditional wife remained a homemaker. In the past decade the number of
divorces among marriages over fifteen years in duration has increased at
an alarming rate.95 Those divorces have brought a deluge of appellate
decisions across the country struggling with the issue of the extent to
which pension rights should be categorized as property acquired during
92. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 261.
93. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 260.
94. Id. at 346, 331 A.2d at 261.
95. One in four divorces in 1974 involved marriages of 15 years or more.
Twenty-one percent of the women divorcing in 1974 had passed their 40th
birthday. Do It Now, June 1977, 5, at col. 3.
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the marriage for purposes of division upon dissolution. To so charac-
terize pension rights in most community property states would give the
wife an absolute right to one half of the proceeds. In any jurisdiction
such a characterization would allow a payment not subject to divestment
by remarriage and perhaps not taxable as income.96
It is common to differentiate between "vested" and "nonvested"
pension rights because pension plans themselves do so. The usual differ-
ence is that prior to vesting, the employee has no rights to any funds if
his employment terminates; after vesting, he does have a right to collect
some funds at some time. Vested rights could mean that all the
employee's rights have matured due to his retirement, i.e., he is already
entitled to collect his pension. However, vested rights ordinarily mean
that some portion of the ultimate pension benefit is payable to the
employee even though he ceases employment prior to retirement: either
his own contributions or employer contributions are returnable to him
on termination of his employment, or a portion of the benefit will be
payable when retirement age is reached.
Most courts have equated vested rights with property rights and
have held them subject to division upon dissolution. 97  In Kruger v.
Kruger 9 8 a New Jersey court conceptually analyzed the nature of pension
payments as recompense for past services and stated: "Logically, ... the
right to such payments should be treated as property 'acquired' during
the marriage .... " The Missouri appellate courts have approved inclu-
sion of vested retirement rights in property9 9 but have not analyzed
either the theory for doing so or the practical problems of application
such as valuation and distribution. In Butcher v. Butcher 100 the court af-
firmed the trial judge's division of property but mentioned that the
96. Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976).
97. In re the Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639
(Colo. App. 1975); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975);
Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1976); Blitt
v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144 (1976); Pellegrino v. Pellegrino, 134
N.J. Super. 512, 342 A.2d 226 (1975); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512
P.2d 736 (1973); Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518
(1975); Schafer v. Schafer, 3 Wis. 2d 166, 87 N.W.2d 803 (1958). Contra, Fenney
v. Fenney, 537 S.W.2d 367 (Ark. 1976); Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242
N.W.2d 884 (1976); Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975). All of the
contrary decisions involve rights to military pensions which courts often view as
nonvested because dependent upon statute. See Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d
96 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976). See also Shaw, Domestic
Relations -Husband's "Vested" Interest in Retirement Plan is Divisible as Marital Prop-
erty, 42 Mo. L. REv. 143 (1977).
98. 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976).
99. Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In re Mar-
riage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
100. 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
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value of a deferred compensation plan was unknown. In In re marriage of
Schulte 10 and Jaeger v. Jaeger 10 2 divisions of property were set aside and
the cases remanded for determination of the proper disposition of cer-
tain assets including interests in the retirement plans.
In some states, that part of the pension to be considered as a marital
asset often is determined by figuring the proportion of the working
years during which the pension rights accrued that the couple was mar-
ried and holding that that proportion of the ultimate benefit constitutes
marital property subject to division upon dissolution.' 1 3 The share of
this asset to which the nonemployee spouse is entitled could be payable
in a lump sum at dissolution or could be ordered paid as a percentage of
the ultimate benefit if and when that benefit is paid. The latter solution
for distribution avoids the difficult problem of placing a present value
on the vested rights to receive retirement benefits in addition to the
mere right to return of contributions."0 4  It also avoids payments to the
nonemployee spouse at the time of divorce when the risk exists that the
employee spouse's early death may preclude him from ever collecting
benefits. 105
Nonvested interests in retirement plans have fared differently than
vested interests. Over thirty-five years ago in French v. French 106 the
California Supreme Court classed such interests as mere expectancies,
holding that they did not constitute property and therefore were not
subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. However, with the in-
crease in both the number of workers covered by pension plans and the
number of divorces in long term marriages, it is not surprising that
California has reevaluated its position and overruled French. In In re
Marriage of Brown 107 the court said that pension rights are not mere
expectancies and that a property-interest analysis without regard to con-
tract is fallacious. The Brown court stated:
The term expectancy describes the interest of a person who
merely foresees that he might receive a future beneficence,
such as the interest of an heir apparent ... or of a beneficiary
designated by a living insured who has a right to change the
beneficiary .... As these examples demonstrate, the defining
characteristic of an expectancy is that its holder has no enforce-
able right to his beneficence.
101. 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
102. 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
103. Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976); Miser v.
Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash.
App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
104. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1976).
105. Id.
106. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
107. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
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Although some jurisdictions classify retirement pensions as
gratuities, it has long been settled that under California law
such benefits "do not derive from the beneficence of the
employer, but are properly part of the consideration earned by
the employee." ... Since pension benefits represent a form of
deferred compensation for services rendered ... the employee's
right to such benefits is a contractual right, derived from the
terms of the employment contract. Since a contractual right is
not an expectancy but a chose in action, a form of property ...
we held in Dryden v. Board of Pension Commrs., supra, 6 Cal.2d
575, 579, 59 P.2d 104, that an employee acquires a property
right to pension benefits when he enters upon the performance
of his employment contract ....
Although, as we have pointed out, supra, courts have previously
refused to allocate this right in a nonvested pension between
the spouses as community property on the ground that such
pension is contingent upon continued employment, we reject
this theory.'0 8
The court indicated that unless the mischaracterization of pension rights
under French were overturned, an inequitable division of community as-
sets would occur:
Over the past decades, pension benefits have become an in-
creasingly significant part of the consideration earned by the
employee for his services. As the date of vesting and retirement
approaches, the value of the pension right grows until it often
represents the most important asset of the marital commun-
ity. 09
In In Re Marriage of Freiberg"o the Brown rule was applied. The
court approved a division awarding the wife a portion of the benefits
earned during the marriage, when and if paid. When such a method of
distribution is used it makes no difference whether the rights were con-
sidered vested or not at the time of divorce, and it points up the essen-
tial soundness of holding that "vesting" is irrelevant to characterization
as property. The courts of Washington"' and Texas 112 also have recog-
nized nonvested rights as assets to be divided.
In the common law states there appear to be no decisions in accord
with the Brown analysis. However, few jurisdictions have ruled on the
question of nonvested rights. A Colorado court held that even vested
military pension rights were not subject to division because they were not
assignable and had no cash surrender value or other fixed lump sum
108. Id. at 844-46, 544 P.2d at 565-66, 126 Gal. Rptr. at 637-38.
109. Id. at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
110. 57 Cal. App. 3d 304, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1976).
111. DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
112. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
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value.' 13 However, a subsequent opinion held that rights to accumu-
lated deductions in an employment plan arising upon termination of
employment were marital property." 4 Apparently, normal vesting is
the determining factor to the Colorado courts. In spite of language in a
New Jersey Supreme Court decision that vesting is not relevant (with
respect to accounts receivable),"15 a lower New Jersey court refused to
classify nonvested pension rights as property subject to division citing
pre-Brown cases in California." 6 The influence of the California deci-
sion in Brown may change the direction of future decisions. It already
may have been influential in changing Texas law." 7
In Missouri interesting litigation is sure to occur because of the
existence of Robbins v. Robbins,'" a 1971 Missouri Supreme Court deci-
sion. It will be easy to cite Robbins as authority for the proposition that
nonvested pension rights are not property to be divided at marriage dis-
solution."19 However, a careful analysis of the decision reveals that the
court did not so hold. Therefore, under the new marriage dissolution
law the treatment of nonvested pension rights is an open question. In
Robbins the divorce court's only power was to award gross alimony, such
amount necessarily to be determined by considering the value of the
assets of the parties at the time of trial. The wife claimed that the pres-
ent value of the husband's potential pension benefits should be included
in the value of assets at the time of trial. The supreme court affirmed
the inclusion of the amount of the husband's contributions to which he
would be entitled if he left the employment, but refused to include a
greater value based on the varying testimonies of a life insurance un-
derwriter and a life insurance agent. It must be noted that such tes-
timony was not as to the value at time of trial, but rather as to value at
the time the husband was thought to be able to retire which was about
two years after the divorce trial.
The supreme court did not state in Robbins that nonvested pension
rights were not property or were not contract rights. Instead, the court
said that the husband did have
a right to his future benefits which the Trustees could not take
away from him so long as he complied with the requirements of
113. In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347 (Colo. App. 1975).
114. In re Marriage of Pope, 544 P.2d 639 (Colo. App. 1975).
115. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
116. White v. White, 136 N.J. Super. 552, 347 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1975). In
Blitt v. Blitt, 139 N.J. Super. 213, 353 A.2d 144 (1976), the court paid lip service
to the fact that "vesting" was not determinative but then held that "control" was
crucial and reached the same result as if it had held that nonvested rights were
not property.
117. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. 1977).
118. 463 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1971).
119. The court did so in Jaeger v. Jaeger, 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St.
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the plan to the time of retirement. There was never any right
in him to a 'present value' of a future pension. The use of the
term 'vested' here is somewhat misleading, and has become a
sort of 'red herring.' 1
20
The court emphasized that at the time of trial there was no ascertained
present value because the husband could do nothing to derive money
from the retirement fund except to obtain a return of his contribution
and that the trustees could not possibly pay him any sum as the present
value of the future pension.
The court then stated: "We consider, and hold, that a valuation of
defendant's rights as the present value of his possible future pension
benefits would be purely speculative and that the court was correct in
holding that such a value was not a present asset of the defendant." 1
21
This is a holding only that valuation of whatever rights the husband had
at the time of trial was not possible and, thus, no value could be utilized
to determine the amount of gross alimony to be ordered. Robbins is a
sensible decision but does not control the issue of property to be divided
under the new marriage dissolution law. The courts' new power to di-
vide property, rather than merely to award an amount of money, means
that inability to place a present value on contract rights acquired during
the marriage need not limit division of "non-vested" pension rights.
Missouri appellate courts already -have held that the powers of the
court are as broad as necessary to divide marital property, 122 have af-
firmed orders for the payment of a percentage of an uncertain sum in
the future, 12' and have affirmed recognition of contract rights as prop-
erty. 2 4 Unlike the situation in most community property states, the
Missouri trial court is not required to award to the other spouse any por-
tion of one spouse's retirement benefit, whether vested or not. There is
no need to fear arbitrary sharing which might be unfair in some in-
stances. With power to order a distribution when and if payments are
made, the present valuation problem of Robbins can be avoided. It is
submitted that both vested and nonvested interests should be recognized
as property so that the trial court in its discretion can fashion an order
that is sound and fair to both parties. This may be the only avenue to
fairness in those traditional long term marriages where the retirement
benefits are the most valuable asset of the parties.
120. 463 S.W.2d at 879.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977); Claunch v.
Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
123. Ortmann v. Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); In re
Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
124. Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975).
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In Nixon v. Nixon 11 5 the St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of
Appeals included as marital property the proceeds of a settlement of the
husband's personal injury action acquired during the marriage. The
court held that the proceeds constituted marital, not separate, property
because they did not fall within any of the statutory exceptions to marital
property. The court accepted without question that the proceeds were
property. Had the asset been a cause of action for personal injuries not
yet reduced to judgment or money, the characterization problem would
have been more difficult. In most community property states the cause
of action as well as proceeds already received are considered property
subject to division.'2 6 If there is hesitancy to place a present value on
the chose in action, the actual sharing of the property can be postponed
by an order to divide the proceeds if and when collected. In New Jersey
the argument has been made that personal injury causes of action127
and workman's compensation claims 128 are mere expectancies and there-
fore do not constitute property subject to division. The courts disposed
of those arguments by noting that a contingency does not make an
interest a mere expectancy and that the distribution may be effectuated
by a division if and when the proceeds of the action do materialize.
However, Missouri courts continue to follow the minority view that a
cause of action for personal injuries is not assignable.' 2 9 In jurisdictions
following that view, the inability to deal with the chose in action has lead
courts to hold that it is not personal property for purposes of division at
divorce.130  These decisions seldom have considered the propriety of
applying the rule against assignment of personal injury actions in the
husband-wife property division situation. The decisions also fail to
explicitly recognize that nonassignability does not necessarily prevent an
interest from being "property." Like the interests in a nonassignable
pension fund, the personal injury cause of action is an interest in which
the marital unit has played a part from its origin. To the extent that it
represents compensation for the inability to earn wages during the mar-
riage or for the medical costs incurred, it provides a fund to replace lost
marital funds, i.e., funds in which the other spouse would clearly have
had an interest at marriage dissolution. The fact that the cause of action
could not be assigned to strangers or even to the other spouse for pur-
125. 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975), noted in Brown, Dissolution of
Marriage-Personal Injury Damages as Marital Propery, 41 Mo. L. REv. 603 (1976).
126. Brown, supra note 125, at 605.
127. Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (1974).
128. Hughes v. Hughes, 132 N.J. Super. 559, 334 A.2d 379 (1975).
129. Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1967).
130. Lowrey v. Lowrey, 260 Ark. 128, 538 S.W.2d 36 (1976).
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poses of its enforcement does not mean that it has no value or substance
worthy of classification as property for purposes of division at divorce.
The more difficult problem in connection with either personal in-
jury causes of action or collected damages is the extent to which the
amount should be classed as marital rather than separate property. A
student commentator has argued that the Nixon court was in error in not
recognizing that the portion of the recovery representing damages for
Mr. Nixon's personal loss of impaired eyesight should have been held to
be his separate property under the "exchange" exception of the statutory
definition of marital property. 131 Although this reasoning may appear
strained, the same result is reached in half the community property
states. Those states include in marital property only the damages for loss
of earnings during the marriage and for medical expenses. 1 32 The fact
that the Missouri trial judge has discretion to divide the marital property
as he deems just would seem to obviate the necessity for such bifurcated
classification of the personal injury recovery.
THE MARITAL-SEPARATE DISTINCTION
The Onerous-Lucrative Source Distinction
In community property theory all time and effort expended by the
marital partners during marriage is considered devoted to the marriage
enterprise; therefore, any property acquired by the "onerous" means of
one's labor is marital.' 33 That property acquired through sources not
attributable to the efforts of the parties is said to be "lucrative" and, if
transferred to one spouse only, constitutes separate property.1 34 These
concepts are embodied in the Missouri dissolution statutes 1 35 which sim-
ply define "marital property" as that acquired during the marriage, with
certain exceptions.' 36 Property acquired prior to the marriage or within
131. Brown, supra note 125.
132. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972); W. DE FUNIAK & M.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 82 (2d ed. 1971).
133. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 127.
134. Id.
135. § 452.330.2, RSMo (Supp. 1975). This section is identical to that of the
original version of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1970). The
commissioners stated that the "original proposal was in substance ... a commun-
ity property rule." FAMILY LAw REPORTER, DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 57 (1974). See text accompanying note 23 supra. See also
Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky. App. 1977) (applying an identical
statute and differentiating separate from marital property on the basis of
whether it was given or earned).
136. § 452.330.2, RSMo (Supp. 1975) defines marital property as:
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the exceptions is not labeled by the statute, but by elimination must be
''separate property."
A major exclusion from marital property is property of one spouse
acquired by gift, descent, bequest, or devise.1 37 These are all lucrative
sources. Because the statute creates a presumption that all property ac-
quired during the marriage is marital, the burden of proof of establish-
ing an exception is on the party asserting it.138 This is relatively easy
with respect to property acquired from lucrative sources. The ambiguity
in the statute in regard to a gift to both spouses was resolved in Forsythe v.
Forsythe 139 by holding that such a gift is marital property. That categori-
zation has long been followed in community property states and is jus-
tified not by the onerous title theory but by recognition that property
may acquire marital status due to the intent of the donor. In Forsythe the
court interpreted the exception to mean a gift to either spouse, not a gift
to both spouses, saying that the statutory intent is to include in marital
property all property which comes to the spouses by virtue of the marital
relation.140 The language in Elmore v. Elmore 141 which seems to approve
the trial court's treatment of such a gift as exempted from marital prop-
erty is dicta because the parties had previously deeded the property to
their children, and no contention was made that it was not exempted.
The Forsythe court readily acknowledged that under this statute one
of the spouses could appropriately introduce evidence to show that the
gift was, in fact, intended only for that spouse.' 42 However, in that case
the proof was insufficient to overcome the marital property presumption
and to overcome by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that
a conveyance to a husband and wife results in joint ownership. Proof of
such intent has seldom been achieved in other states with respect to
jointly titled gifts. 1 4 3
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, be-
quest, devise or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the mar-
riage.
In Forsythe v. Forsythe, 558 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977), the court
stated that the purpose is to treat as marital property all assets acquired during
the marriage by the industry of either spouse.
137. § 452.330.2, RSMo (Supp. 1975).
138. Id.; Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
139. 558 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
140. Id. at 677.
141. 557 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
142. 658 S.W.2d at 678.
143. But see Singer v. Singer, 252 Ky. 707, 68 S.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1934);
Raney v. Raney, 128 Mo. App. 167, 106 S.W. 577 (Spr. Ct. App. 1907); Von
Hutchins v. Pope, 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
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Acquisition Prior to Marriage
Because the statutory definition and the presumption of marital
property depend on the property having been "acquired" during mar-
riage, "acquisition" is a key concept. Missouri courts have begun the
process of defining acquisition but numerous unresolved issues remain.
Title and Payment Prior to Marriage
The Lombard property in Conrad v. Bowers 144 was titled and paid
for by the husband prior to the marriage. It is a simple example of
property clearly not acquired during the marriage. As one would expect,
the court set it aside as the husband's separate property with little discus-
sion.
Title Prior to Mai-riage-Payment During Marriage
Cain v. Cain 145 illustrates the problem of property acquisition in the
sense of a purchase having been made prior to the marriage, but with
payment having been made during the marriage. The husband received
title to land in return for a down payment of $3,500 and his note for
$16,500 secured by a mortgage. Two different methods of treating this
type situation have been followed in community property states. Texas
and New Mexico follow the traditional "inception of title" rule of Spain:
the character of the property as marital or separate is determined by the
marital status of the parties at the time of "inception" of title. 146 Under
the inception of title rule, the marital community is reimbursed for those
marital funds expended to pay the acquisition cost of the property, but
the remainder of its value, including any increase in value due to gen-
eral economic conditions, would be the separate property of the spouse
who had incepted title prior to marriage. California, Idaho, Nevada, and
Washington apply the more recent "source of funds" rule: the character
of the property is determined by the source of the funds financing the
purchase. 47 Under the source of funds rule the property is considered
to be "acquired" as it is paid for; therefore, that portion of the ultimate
value (increased or decreased by general economic conditions) which is
the same as the portion of the purchase price paid with marital funds is
marital property.
144. 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
145. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976), noted in Haines, Dissolution of
Marriage-Division of Property Which Has Increased in Value, 42 Mo. L. REV. 479
(1977).
146. Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); W. DE FUNIAK &
M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 133; Haines, supra note 145, at 480.
147. In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483
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The Cain decision of the Springfield district of the court of appeals
adopted the inception of title rule for determining when property is ac-
quired; ' 48 it has been followed by the Kansas City district in Stark v.
Stark 149 and Davis v. Davis. 150 In Cain the trial court found that the
appreciation in value to approximately $565,000 had been "due to the
development of adjacent property and not due to any efforts made by"
the marital parties.15 ' The appellate court recognized that this entire
increase in value due to economic conditions was the separate property
of the husband. This is, of course, in accord with the statutory exception
from marital property of "the increase in value of property acquired
prior to marriage." ' 52
The appellate court in Cain also recognized that jurisdictions fol-
lowing the inception of title rule allow a claim and sometimes a lien
against the property for reimbursement of the amount of marital funds
devoted to its purchase price. 5 3 Apparently, no lien had been sought
in Cain; the appellate court noted that the presence and size of other
marital property enabled it to fairly divide the marital property without
having to rule on the legality of such a lien.' 54 In Stark v. Stark '5 5 some
marital funds may have been spent on the husband's debt for his sepa-
rate property, but the appellate court indicated that the division of other
marital property favored the wife and, in effect, reimbursed her for this
expenditure of marital funds. Because there was sufficient marital prop-
erty to allow a division which effectively returned to the wife her share
of the marital funds expended on the separate property, the failure to
set out these funds as part of the value of the marital assets was not
significant in the reimbursement.
In the situation where there are insufficient other marital assets to
effect a reimbursement, the value of the marital property should include
the amount of marital funds expended to buy the separate property.
The amount must be identified clearly and a lien placed against the
148. 536 S.W.2d at 870-72.
149. 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
150. 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
151. 536 S.W.2d at 875.
152. § 452.330.2(5), RSMo (Supp. 1975).
153. 536 S.W.2d at 871, quoting 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 510(a)(4) (1944);
Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WASH. L.
REv. 379 (1969).
154. 536 S.W.2d at 871.
155. 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976). Similar reasoning is suggested
in Daniels v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977), where
$5,800 of the wife's money was invested in the husband's real estate prior to
marriage. The wife's attorney apparently failed to request a lien for return of
these funds. The appellate court approved giving her $3,700 from other marital
property due to her pre-marriage investment. The wife should have asked for a
constructive trust on the husband's property for return of the full $5,800. See
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
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separate property for the portion of that amount to which the other
spouse is considered fairly entitled. Assuming Missouri courts continue
to follow the inception of title rule, in a case where marital funds have
been paid on a debt owed for separate property of one spouse, the at-
torney for the other spouse should request a finding of the exact
amount of marital funds spent and request that that amount be consid-
ered a marital asset similar to a debt owed by the owner of the separate
property.
An example of possible inequity is Davis v. Davis,15 6 which applied
the "inception of title" rule to shares in a close corporation. Although
the appellate opinion is somewhat unclear, it appears that prior to the
marriage the husband and his mother acquired the assets of an oil busi-
ness and then incorporated, the mother taking 50 shares and the hus-
band 150 shares. The assets were purchased for $84,000, all of which
had been paid at time of trial, including $16,000 paid prior to marriage
and $22,500 from the proceeds of a loan obtained by the husband and
his mother. The trial judge found that the wife had a "marital interest"
in the assets of this company to the extent of $40,304.50 which was set
apart to her "as her marital interest in said corporation." The appellate
court noted that the precise basis for that computation did not appear.
The husband obtained a reversal by arguing the inception of title rule.
This may be a case of unfair division of property because of a failure to
ascertain what marital funds had been spent on the separate property
and to request a lien in that amount. Only $38,500 of the purchase price
of the assets of the oil business was accounted for by the $16,000 and
$22,500 payments. Because the assets were purchased individually by the
husband and his mother, most of the remaining $45,400 of the purchase
price may have been paid for with marital funds. 157  If that was the
situation, a lien for reimbursement should have been placed on the hus-
band's shares in the corporation. Perhaps this is the result the trial judge
was trying to reach when he erroneously gave the wife a $40,000 interest
in the corporation.
A student writer criticized the inception of title rule as not realisti-
cally reflecting the theory of a marital partnership and as discouraging
marital partners from investing marital funds in separate property. 158
156. 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
157. On the other hand, the case may illustrate a legitimate method for a
spouse to pay for previously acquired property during marriage without the
funds actually being marital funds. In the absence of facts that would allow for
piercing the corporate veil (see text accompanying note 173 infra), a normal
financing practice would be for the newly formed corporation to assume the
debt for the assets. The payments would then be made with corporate funds, not
with the husband's earnings. The husband would have exchanged his separately
owned property for corporate shares which would remain separate property.
(See text accompanying note 181 infra).
158. Haines, supra note 145 at 484.
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The writer pointed out that, because the statute leaves income from
separate property as marital property, nearly all expenditures on sepa-
rate property will be from marital funds. It was suggested that marital
discord may result from objection by the nonowner spouse to marital
funds being expended on separate property when there is no chance of
that spouse benefiting from any increase in value of the property. At-
torneys advising the spouses, particularly at the stage of an antenuptial
agreement, should be aware of this effect. Clients should be informed
that they have no chance of obtaining more than reimbursement if they
invest any of their own earnings or income (which are marital property)
in payment for the other spouse's separate property. On the other hand,
the client who owns property, either independently or through a close
corporation, which is not completely paid for prior to marriage should
be informed of the effect of keeping the property separate while using
marital funds to pay the debt.
Title Prior to Marriage-Improvements During Marriage
In Stark v. Stark 159 the court noted that the value of the property
acquired prior to the marriage had increased primarily due to improve-
ments added to the property with marital funds. This is a significant
difference from the Cain context where all the increase in value was due
to general economic conditions inflating the value of the land. 6 ' In Stark
$12,000 of marital funds was used to construct a home on the land. An
additional $15,000 enhancement in the property's value was attributed
by the court to the inflated value of that improvement. Of course, the
marital estate should be increased by the $12,000 spent to improve the
separate property, just as it should for marital funds devoted to the
purchase price. However, the wife did not request a lien for the $12,000
or for the increase in the value of the improvement, but unsuccessfully
attempted to show that the entire farm had been converted to marital
property.
Although neither party so argued, the appellate court in Stark held
that the inception of title rule caused all of the increase in value of the
separate property to belong to the separate property owner. The court
then held that the trial court's award of sixty percent of the marital
property to the wife sufficiently took into account the marital funds ex-
pended on the separate property. The court thus avoided the issue
whether both the money spent and the increased value of the improve-
ment should be accounted for. It also did not have to rule on a lien for
reimbursement since the other assets were considered sufficient for that
purpose. In fact, the amount of the marital property which the wife
received exceeded the husband's portion by only $8,000. The husband,
159. 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
160. 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
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by retaining the property which had increased in value $27,000, thus
benefited $11,000 more than the wife.
De Funiak and Vaughn assert that the traditional Spanish rule and
that of the community property states is that if the spouses' labor or
industry has contributed to the increase in value then the community
should share in the increase in proportion to the community's contribution to
the increase.'61 This seems a fair result in terms of allowing the marital
estate to gain by its investment of time and industry to improve one of
the spouse's separate property. Achievement of this result would not be
difficult as expert testimony concerning the value of the land with and
without the improvement is probably available. 162 The Stark division of
the other marital property leaves the wife with little return for that in-
vestment.
If the marital property does not include the proportional increase in
value of improvements added with marital funds or labor, incentive will
be given to diversion of marital funds into improving separate property.
Opportunities for overreaching by a sophisticated spouse or by one who
has advice of counsel will be enhanced.16 3 On balance it may be better
policy for the increased value of the added improvement to be included
within marital property and therefore subject to division. The legislature
could modify the increase in value exception of the statute. However, no
legislative modification is actually needed to reach that result. Applica-
bility of the exception for the increase in value of property acquired
prior to marriage rests on interpretation of the term "property ac-
quired." Since the improvement itself is added during the marriage, a
logical interpretation would be that the improvement is property acquired
during the marriage. Thus, the exception would not apply. This interpre-
tation would be in accord with the Cain court's definition of "acquire" as
"tWo come into possession, control or power of disposal of." 114 This is
apparently also the underlying rationale for the traditional Spanish rule
that classified as separate property only those increases in value due to
161. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 169.
162. See, e.g., Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
163. The importance of tracing marital funds into separate property and dis-
tinguishing such funds from separate property is graphically illustrated in
Daniels v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977). All the wife's
earnings had been deposited in the husband's Postal Employees Credit Union
account. The appellate court assumed without deciding that this would make the
funds separate within the inception of title rule since the husband owned the
account prior to marriage. This result is improper. The inception of title rule
merely characterizes the main property; it does not convert marital funds ex-
pended on separate property into separate property. One need only read Sin-
gleton v. Singleton, 525 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975) to be convinced
that unscrupulous spouses still are able to fleece their mates of considerable
property.
164. 536 S.W.2d at 872.
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general economic conditions.1 65 Because this issue apparently was not
argued or considered in Stark, future Missouri courts may have to re-
solve the problem.
Title Prior to Marriage-Effect of Spouse's Industry
The distinction between increases in value of separate property due
to general economic conditions and those due to the industry of one of
the spouses could be crucial where no isolated improvement is added,
but the management efforts of one of the spouses actually increases the
value of the property. A prior owned business in which one spouse
works substantially all of the time and which he owns as a sole pro-
prietor or substantial portions of which he owns as a partner or close
corporation shareholder are likely examples. Once the inception of title
rule is applied, the fact of ownership of a business interest prior to mar-
riage could allow marital labor, which ought to be devoted to the marital
partnership, to aggrandize separate property unless the increase in value
exception is made inapplicable to increases in value attributable to mari-
tal labor. In Texas, which is an inception of title state, Norris v.
Vaughan ' 66 illustrates a distinction that can be drawn. Prior to marriage,
the husband owned gas wells and an interest in a partnership concerning
which he did very little during the marriage. The court held that these
interests remained separate property. The husband also owned a one-
fourth interest in a partnership for which, during the marriage, he
negotiated an agreement obtaining the right to drill a number of wells.
The one-fourth interest which he had in those wells by virtue of his
partnership interest was held to be community property under what the
court described as the "well recognized theory" 167 that property ac-
quired after marriage by toil, talent, or industry is community prop-
erty. 68  In effect, the Texas court treated the increased assets of the
partnership, not as an increase in the value of the husband's property
owned prior to marriage, but as new property acquired during the mar-
riage. In New Mexico income from separate property remains separate
unless the owner's time and industry has been devoted to its production.
In Moore v. Moore 169 income from a ranch owned by the husband prior
165. De Funiak and Vaughn state that only an increase in capital value ot
separate assets remains separate, but that all increases due to labor and industry
are community property. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 169.
However, in a comprehensive analysis of decisions in the community property
states, Bartke reports that five of the eight states reimburse the community for
the actual value in labor or funds expended but not for any further enhance-
ment due to inflation. He points out that in more recent years the more rapid
rate of inflation calls for including that proportionate increase, as did the tradi-
tional Spanish law. Bartke, supra note 153, at 419.
166. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
167. Id. at 497-98, 260 S.W.2d at 680.
168. Id. at 501, 260 S.W.2d at 682.
169. 71 N.M. 495, 379 P.2d 784 (1963).
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to marriage was included in community property during those periods
when he managed the ranch himself, but not when the work was done
by a hired manager.
These cases suggest that not only earnings of a sole proprietor, but
also increased assets of a partnership due to a spouse's efforts should be
considered as "property acquired during the marriage" rather than
merely as an increase in value of a prior owned interest. The underlying
concept controlling these characterizations is that property acquired due
to the toil and industry of the spouses during the marriage is marital
property. Of course, under the Missouri statute, income from separate
property is already marital property; 170 therefore, all receipts of a sole
proprietorship or drawings from a previously owned partnership interest
would be marital unless traced to a sale of a previously owned capital
asset. The uncertain issue is the extent to which increased asset value
also should be included as property acquired during marriage. A portion
of the partner's interest (his share of profits and surplus if the business
were liquidated) 17 ' may represent an increase due to general economic
conditions in the value of the capital invested prior to marriage; another
portion of that interest may be directly attributable to his services to the
partnership during the marriage. The latter is particularly likely where
the partner has devoted long hours to the partnership but has drawn
only minimal amounts from it. In community property states, statements
are made by the courts that the increase in value is apportioned between
separate and marital property in order to reflect the underlying notion
that property acquired due to the labor of the spouses should be classed
as marital. There is a wide diversity of methods employed, including
allocating a fair return on capital investment to the separate property
and allocating the amount of a reasonable salary for the efforts ex-
pended to marital property. 17 2
The close corporation wholly owned or controlled during the mar-
riage by one spouse the value of which has increased during the mar-
riage due to the efforts of that spouse presents even more difficult
problems. Because the corporation has its own identity, the only prop-
erty in question in the dissolution action is usually the stock. If it was
owned prior to the marriage, an increase in its value would seem rather
clearly excluded from marital property by the statutory exception.
170. Income is not within any of the exceptions to the definition of marital
property in § 452.330.2 RSMo (Supp. 1975). The Commissioner's Note accom-
panying the prototype UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 states that
income from property owned prior to marriage is marital. Cain v. Cain, 536
S.W.2d 866, 870 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976).
171. § 358.260, RSMo 1969.
172. King, The Challenge of Apportionment, 37 WASH. L. REV. 483 (1962); cases
collected in Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 530 (1953); W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra
note 132, at 165.
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Various approaches have been used to characterize a part of the
shares' value or a part of the corporate assets as marital property. For
example, statements by a Texas court that corporate assets remain the
property of the corporation "unless a well recognized basis for disre-
garding the corporate entity exists" 173 were followed by cases attempting
to "pierce the corporate veil" by showing that the corporation was
merely the alter ego of the owner spouse. In Dillingham v. Dillingham 174
the court held that when a businessman conducts virtually all his busi-
ness affairs through a corporation in which he is the sole shareholder,
the assets of the corporation acquired during the marriage are com-
munity property. The court agreed with a former attorney general's
opinion that it would be an invitation to anyone wanting to defeat the
rights of his wife to organize such a corporation and thereby prevent
the assets acquired during the marriage from being part of the marital
estate. The wife was given some of the "corporate" assets as her share of
the marital estate. In Uranga v. Uranga 175 the court held that a corpora-
tion owned by the husband "must be presumed to be his alter ego" 176 on
a record showing that he kept only one checking account for both his
personal affairs and for the corporation, that part of his salary was used
to defray corporate expenses, and that he owed $330,000 to the corpo-
ration. On the other hand, many decisions have held that where the
corporate affairs are kept separate from those of the individual, the cor-
porate entity will not be disregarded.1 77
Another approach sometimes used to reach the increase in value of
corporate assets due to a spouse's labor is to evaluate whether he was
paid a reasonable salary for his services to the corporation. If he was
not, a portion of the stock's increase in value equal to the amount he
should have received for his services might be considered property
acquired during the marriage by his industry. 178  The difficulty of
showing that the remuneration given was inadequate is such that many
173. Wells v. Hiskett, 288 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956). The bases
for disregarding the corporate entity were stated to be where the corporation is
used as a means of protection against fraud, where the corporate organization is
illegally conducted, where the corporation is used as a mere sham and device to
protect individuals against liability, where the corporation did not exist except
practically as a shadow of the individual, where the corporate entity is used to
evade existing legal obligations, and where the corporate and individual transac-
tions have not been distinct.
More cases of this type should be expected in the future because the Texas
Supreme Court recently held that there is no power to divide separate property.
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
174. 434 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
175. 527 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
176. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
177. E.g., Mifflin v. Mifflin, 556 P.2d 854 (Idaho 1976).
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decisions have affirmed findings that the increase in value remained
separate property.1
7 9
Although the means chosen vary a great deal, there is a large body
of precedent in community property states for treating what appear to
be increases in the value of prior owned separate property as property
acquired during the marriage due to the efforts of one of the spouses.
Certainly, such a possibility should be welcomed in flagrant cases of at-
tempts to aggrandize separate property at the expense of the marital
unit. Yet, the fairly large numbers of unsuccessful claims attest to the
fact that separate property can be developed during a marriage without
fear of subjecting it to division in case of dissolution.1 80 Among the
Missouri cases involving a previously owned corporation, only the record
in Davis v. Davis '8 ' (discussed above in regard to payment of the pur-
chase price) indicates that such arguments may have been pertinent. In
Davis the husband was not only president of the oil company but actively
ran the operation. He did everything from driving a truck to working in
the service station to keeping the books, yet his salary was only $6,500
annually at the time of trial. There was evidence that the value of assets
of the company were between $132,000 and $152,000 at the time of
trial. A fair proportion of the increase from the $84,000 purchase price
might be attributable to the services of the husband during the marriage.
However, there was no evidence of what his services were reasonably
worth or that normal market increase of the assets owned at time of the
marriage would not account for the increase. Missouri counsel advising
persons contemplating marriage should inform them that records of a
previously owned corporation should be kept separately, and that a
reasonable salary should be paid for services rendered to the corpora-
tion. Such action is likely to protect their separate property from claims
of the prospective spouse in case of dissolution.
Exchanges
Property shown to have been acquired during the marriage and
presumed marital can be classed as separate if it is further shown that it
was acquired in exchange for separate property. This statutory exception
to marital property is the same as the "source" or "tracing" doctrine well
179. Kenney v. Kenney, 128 Cal. App. 2d 128, 274 P.2d 951 (1954); Van
Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 859 (1921); Mifflin v. Mifflin, 97
Idaho 895, 556 P.2d 854 (1976); Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d
638 (1976); Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 530 (1953).
180. The Texas court of appeals recently has held that the community is not
entitled to reimbursement for the value of one spouse's labor expended on the
separate property of the other. Hale v. Hale, 557 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Ct. App.
1977).
181. 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
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known in community property states and going back to ancient Spanish
law. 182 One way to state the community property doctrine is: "Property
acquired in an exchange partakes of the nature of the property given in
exchange." 183 Illustrative of the exception is In re Marriage of
Armbrech, s 4 a Colorado case applying statutory language similar to that
of Missouri. The wife's evidence that she had bought the home during
the marriage with the proceeds of the sale of a home she owned prior to
the marriage led to the holding that the home was not marital property.
What is contemplated by the statutory exception is a transaction that
merely changes the form of the property but does not change its
character as separate property. If property was acquired during mar-
riage and was not a gift, the question should always be asked: "What was
given in exchange for this property?"
Reppy and de Funiak have said: "Tracing back to a separate prop-
erty source is by far the most common means of rebutting the presump-
tion favoring community ownership." 185 However, Brocklebank be-
lieves that attorneys do not always appreciate the importance of the
source doctrine in classifying property. 8 6 The appellate decisions indi-
cate that such is the situation in Missouri. No appellate decision was
found which involved specific property classified as separate because its
acquisition was traced to separate property exchanged for it.18 7 It is
possible that the 10 acres in Hulsey v. Hulsey 188 acquired by the wife by
trading inherited property is in this category, but the opinion indicates
the trade occurred prior to marriage making the 10 acres separate in
any event. In both Conrad v. Bowers 189 and Jaeger v. Jaeger 190 the court in
dicta clearly recognized the effect of an exchange, but the evidence
failed to establish one.
In long term marriages in Missouri, it would be difficult to trace the
source of much property back to separate property. Perhaps this is why
few cases seem to have done so. For the future, attorneys should advise
clients who want to protect their separate property from possible division
in the event of marriage dissolution to keep records that will facilitate
tracing.
182. W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 134 (1962).
183. Id. at 138.
184. 518 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1974).
185. W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAK, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
140 (1975).
186. W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 182, at 134-38.
187. However, it should be obvious that in a sole proprietorship owned prior
to marriage the turnover of inventory will result in most of the stock acquired
during the marriage being separate if separate accounts have been kept. The
accounts will perform the tracing function.
188. 550 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
189. 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
190. 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
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The tracing concept applies equally well to marital property ex-
changed for other property. The newly acquired property will retain its
character as marital not only because of the statutory marital presump-
tion but also due to the source doctrine. This was obvious in Nixon v.
Nixon191 where the proceeds of a personal injury settlement were clas-
sified as marital and then traced into a partnership and a corporation.
The imposition of a lien on separate property for marital funds spent on
it is also an application of the tracing principle. It is interesting that over
a hundred years ago, the Missouri Supreme Court applied essentially
this reasoning to a case involving community funds from Louisiana
which the husband allegedly used to purchase separately titled land in
Missouri. The court held that a trust could be imposed on the land to
protect the wife's interest.' 92
Transmutation
In Conrad v. Bowers 193 property which had been owned by the hus-
band prior to the marriage was sold and the proceeds used to purchase
the Elmhurst property. Application of the statutory language would re-
sult in an immediate presumption that the property was marital because
acquired during marriage. A reclassification as separate would occur
when it was shown that the source of the funds used to buy it was sepa-
rate property. However, the Elmhurst property was titled in the joint
names of the husband and wife. The court held that the effect of doing
so was to make the property marital for purposes of division at marriage
dissolution. The dissent criticized the holding for modifying the statu-
tory structure. However, the majority had to deal with the common law
presumption, long recognized in Missouri, that when one marital part-
ner titles property in the names of both, he intends a gift to or settle-
ment upon the other. In the absence of express statutory language, the
court found no legislative intent to eliminate this pre-existing presump-
tion and held that all property acquired during marriage which was
taken in joint names is marital unless it is shown that it was acquired in
exchange for separate property and that the transfer was not intended as
a provision for or gift to the other spouse.194 The court assumed with-
out discussion that such titling would result in a "contribution to or gift
to the marital estate" rather than an individual gift of one-half the prop-
191. 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
192. Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848).
193. 533 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
194. An interesting contrast is provided by Young v. Young, 329 A.2d 386(Me. 1974), in which the Maine court applied similar statutory language. The
common law presumption was not argued. The court held that prior to the ef-
fective date of the new statutory concept of marital property there could be no
intent to convert separate property to marital property.
190 [Vol. 43
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erty as separate property to the other spouse.'9 5 Having classed it as
marital, the court could divide all of the property in a just manner. In
fact, the entire Elmhurst property had been awarded to the husband
and the appellate court affirmed.
The decision leaves open what will be a showing by clear and con-
vincing evidence that such joint titling was not intended as a provision
for a settlement upon or a gift to the other spouse. In the Florida case
of Goldstein v. Goldstein 196 the husband had placed separate securities in a
jointly titled stock brokerage account to prevent their distribution in
bankruptcy but asserted they were separate for divorce purposes. The
divorce court held that he could not divide his interests in that way and
that if the title was joint for bankruptcy then it was for divorce also. In
contrast, a wealthy woman in New Hampshire who titled her realty
jointly with that of her new and younger husband was permitted to re-
tain it as separate property by showing that the transfer was conditioned
on his building a home on it and supporting her, which he had failed to
do. 197 A Maryland woman succeeded in imposing a resulting trust on
jointly titled property for return of her funds upon proof that the par-
ties had agreed that her interest would remain separate. 198
One wonders whether joint titling for purposes of estate planning or
for protection from future creditors, with a written memorandum to the
effect that there is no intent that the property be classed as marital or be
subjeited to division by a court in the event of marriage dissolution, will
be effective for both purposes. The Florida decision refusing to recog-
nize the bifurcated intent of the husband may be furthering a public
policy designed to discourage fraud on other parties such as those in the
bankruptcy proceeding. All three of these illustrative cases would be
consistent with a public policy to further the intent of both the parties as
evidenced by their mutual agreement. When one party titles his property
jointly, it is reasonable to assume that the other party expects it to be an
addition to marital property. To protect those expectations, the property
should be classed marital unless the donor's contrary intent was clearly
brought to the attention of the donee. The evidence in Goldstein did not
reveal such notice. Because a memorandum of agreement signed by both
parties would evidence both the parties' contrary intent, it should be
permitted to overcome the presumption.
195. Applying identical statutory language the Colorado court has reached
this same conclusion. In re Marriage of Moncrief, 535 P.2d 1137 (Colo. Ct. App.
1975). See also Gist v. Gist, 537 P.2d 460 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Vadnais v. Vad-
nais, 558 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
196. 310 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
197. Sweetnam v. Sweetnam, 115 N.H. 80, 333 A.2d 456 (1975).
198. Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 549, 312 A.2d 286 (1973). See also Raney v.
Raney, 128 Mo. App. 167, 106 S.W. 577 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907) (notes titledjointly were vested in the wife alone).
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The Conrad decision is of inestimable importance in Missouri be-
cause, without specific statutory authorization, it establishes the principle
that "transmutation" of the character of the property for purposes of
division at dissolution is possible. In community property states the term
"transmutation" means a change in the character of the property from
either separate to marital or from marital to separate due to the intent
of the parties. 199 There is variety among the community property
states' laws regarding transmutation. In California the statute specifically
allows husband or wife to engage in any transaction with the other in
regard to property.200 It is recognized that a married person may con-
vert his separate property to community property by his voluntary
act.2 0  The California courts have recognized transmutation based
solely on the owner's oral statements, even when the documentary title
had not been changed. 20 2 The result has been a great deal of litigation
to determine whether the documentary or oral transactions (sometimes
referred to as "pillow talk") in fact established the owner's intent to
change the character of the property.20 3 Other community property
states are more demanding in the degree and quality of proof re-
quired.20 4 The Conrad decision establishes for Missouri the precedent
that a documentary transaction can transmute otherwise separate property
to marital property because it evidences an intent to do so.
In Jaeger v. Jaeger2 0 5 transmutation by intent also was recognized.
The husband had owned considerable stocks and bonds prior to mar-
riage. Some of these were sold during the marriage at or near the time
that stocks constituting marital property were sold. The amounts re-
ceived for the separate and marital stocks were not indicated in the
opinion. The proceeds were commingled to purchase additional stocks
which were apparently titled only in the husband's name. The court held
that the newly acquired stocks were all marital property stating:
We do not believe the exchange exception ... is applicable
when a person uses both his pre-marriage property and marital
199. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 213; 41 C.J.S. Husband
and Wife § 494 (1944). In 1860 the Missouri Supreme Court, applying the
Spanish law of the Louisiana territory, held that shares given to the wife which
.would be her separate property had been converted by her marriage contract to
community property. The court held that the parties "could vary the law and
place property in the community which otherwise would not have gone into it."
Morrison's Administrator v. St. Gemme's Administrator, 31 Mo. 230, 238 (1860).
200. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 5103 (West 1970).
201. Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); In re Estate of
Rogers, 24 Cal. App. 3d 69, 100 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1972).
202. Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956);
Estate of Raphael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 206 P.2d 391 (1949).
203. "In California, transmutation is dangerously easy." W. REPPY & W. DE
FUNIAK, supra note 185, at 421.
204. Id. at 422-26.
205. 547 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
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property to purchase new property during the marriage. In
commingling his own assets with marital assets the spouse has
failed to sufficiently segregate his own property. Such a com-
mingling is indicative of an intent on the part of the owner of
the pre-marriage property to contribute it to the marital es-
tate.
206
The transmutation here was evidenced not by the documents but by the
conduct of the husband in commingling the funds. The decision leaves
open the effect of records indicating the exact amounts of money from
the sale of the separate property which went into the purchased stocks.
The ability to trace and the obvious intent to do so might overcome the
intent evidenced by the commingling; there could be an "uncommin-
gling" if amounts could be accurately traced. Many community property
courts find themselves involved in intricate problems of "uncommin-
gling" because they hold that commingling alone, so long as it is possible
to trace sources, is not enough to convert separate property to marital
property.207
Broad language in the Conrad opinion leaves open the question of
what kind of evidence in addition to documents and commingling could
suffice to establish an intent to transmute separate property to marital
property. In holding that the husband's prior owned property remained
his separate property, the court noted that the implication of the prior
owned property exception was that such property "maintained and
treated as such after the marriage is not marital property." 2 08 This
suggests that "pillow talk" could establish a transmutation through treat-
ing the property as marital.2 0 9  In California sufficient statements have
been, "What is mine is yours ... this money will go into a home for us;
it is just as much yours as mine." 210
Permitting such transmutation in Missouri would be especially sig-
nificant if the inception of title doctrine continues to be applied. In any
inception of title situation where marital funds have been applied to
separate property, attorneys should be alert to statements by the sepa-
rate owner that indicate that he or she had begun to think of the prop-
erty as for the benefit of both of them. That type of statement would
not be unlikely in the separate owner's attempt to justify spending mar-
206. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
207. Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 430 P.2d 685 (1967); W. REPPY & W. DE
FUNIAK, supra note 185, at 145.
208. 533 S.W.2d at 621.
209. This possibility raises interesting questions concerning the scope of the
husband-wife testimonial privilege in Missouri. This privilege has previously been
held inapplicable to property and business transactions. Dunn v. Vick, 345
S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1961). The privilege is not applicable in California. Durrell v.
Bacon, 138 Cal. App. 396, 32 P.2d 644 (1931).
210. Id. at 398, 32 P.2d at 645.
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ital funds on the separate property. However, in both Stark v. Stark21
and Davis v. Davis,212 the efforts to convince the court of transmutation
by intent failed. In Stark after the marriage both spouses signed a note
and mortgage on the separate property. From this the wife argued that
the property had become marital by common understanding between
them. The court noted that there was no evidence that the note and
mortgage were actually issued "on the faith and credit of the separate
property" 213 and no other evidence to indicate that the joint mortgage
was intended to create a new estate between them. The court stated the
general rule to be that the nature of funds expended on separate prop-
erty does not change its status.214 In view of the usual practice of Mis-
souri lenders to require both spouses' signatures whenever individually
owned real estate is conveyed or encumbered, the decision is not unex-
pected.
In Davis the court recognized that the conduct of the parties may
evidence a clear intention that separate property be contributed to the
community or to the other spouse. The wife, trying to obtain an interest
in a close corporation in which the husband owned three-fourths of the
shares, argued that the fact that she had been made a director and a
vice-president and had signed notes secured by deeds of trust the pro-
ceeds of which were used in the corporation evidenced such intent. The
court pointed out that the deeds of trust were on property in which she
had no interest and that there was no evidence that she needed an inter-
est in the corporation in order to be a corporate officer. Her evidence
that she had become a guarantor of a corporate obligation with no
further explanation of the transaction likewise did not suffice to establish
the requisite intent to confer upon her an interest in her husband's cor-
porate stock. Probably helpful to the husband was his testimony that she
had repeatedly told him she wanted no part of the business. Both Stark
and Davis are devoid of evidence indicating that the owner of the sepa-
rate property desired to create an interest in it for his wife. They simply
show an owner using his spouse's signature and name and marital funds
for his own benefit. As discussed earlier, a lien for the return of the
marital funds should have been imposed. 215 However, to find a trans-
mutation of the character of the whole property, evidence of an intent to
benefit the other spouse would be needed. 2 16
211. 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
212. 544 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
213. 539 S.W.2d at 782.
214. Id. at 783, citing 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 583 (1944).
215. In Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976), the re-
financing did not change the status of the property, but a lien in the amount of
funds spent on the property was imposed. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
216. A recent Missouri decision, Daniels v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. 1977), upheld classification of the husband's credit union account
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Transmutation by intent is also an important concept for changing
the character of property from marital to separate. Evidence of donative
intent by one party and acceptance by the other should suffice to con-
vert marital property to separate by virtue of the statutory gift excep-
tion.2 17 A simple Christmas gift purchased with marital funds and in-
tended for the sole benefit of the donee could qualify. There is a more
serious question of donative intent in regard to an elaborate television
and stereo system "given" by the husband to the wife for Christmas or a
new sailing boat "given" by the wife to the husband for his birthday.
There has been a reluctance in community property states to find the
intent to transmute marital property to separate property if the item is
very expensive or can be enjoyed by both of the parties after the
"gift." 218 An example of insufficient donative intent is Neeley v.
Neeley 219 in which the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that a donative intent was not evidenced by the hus-
band's transfer of ownership of life insurance to the wife. The husband
testified that he transferred the insurance so that the proceeds would
not be in his estate at death, but that he did not understand that the
transfer could make his wife the owner. He further testified that he
wanted the insurance to benefit his children. The court also noted that
no gift tax return had been filed.
Valid Agreement
The Missouri statute excepts from marital property that which is
acquired during marriage if "excluded by valid agreement of the par-
ties." 220 The well known separation agreement executed after the par-
ties have separated and in contemplation of marriage dissolution or legal
separation certainly is a "valid agreement" if found not unconscion-
able.221 However, all community property states except Texas also rec-
ognize as valid an antenuptial agreement to exclude all or various types
as marital property due to transmutation. The wife had deposited all of her
earnings in the account, and the account was used for joint purposes. The wife
also had signed a signature card. These actions led the wife to believe the ac-
count was jointly owned and indicated an intent on the husband's part to benefit
the wife. The effect of finding transmutation rather than imposing a lien for the
marital funds is to convert the entire separate property to marital. In most cases
this would result in a greater dollar amount being classified as marital; however,
the fact that this theory has succeeded only once in Missouri indicates the im-
portance of using it in conjunction with a request for a lien.
217. § 452.330.2, RSMo (Supp. 1975); In re Walsh's Estate, 66 Cal. App. 2d
704, 152 P.2d 750 (1944).
218. In re Walsh's Estate, 66 Cal. App. 2d 704, 152 P.2d 750 (1944).
219. 563 P.2d 302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
220. § 452.330.3, RSMo (Supp. 1975).
221. See Mo. Bar C.L.E., Missouri Family Law ch. 9 (1976).
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of property from marital property.22  De Funiak claims that this free-
dom to agree not to be governed by the provisions regulating earned
property during marriage existed in Spain as early as the year 693.223
The statutes usually require the contract to be written, acknowledged,
and witnessed like a deed, and to be recorded in order to affect third
parties.2 24 Of course, an antenuptial contract in a community property
jurisdiction usually governs the property throughout the marriage, at
time of divorce, and at time of death. In an old case an antenuptial
contract designed to govern division of property only at divorce or legal
separation was held invalid, apparently because it could encourage di-
vorce.225 However, in 1973 the Nevada court held that it is reasonable
and proper for a couple about to marry to provide for the contingency
of divorce. 226 This is the same development that is occurring in com-
mon law states. Traditionally, provisions for support or property dispo-
sition at divorce were considered void in any agreement executed prior
to the breakdown of the marriage; 227 but in recent years a number of
courts have held them valid in regard to property disposition.228 With
more persons entering second marriages than previously and the re-
moval of recrimination and collusion as bans to divorce, courts are rec-
ognizing the social advantages of allowing persons to plan ahead for the
divorce contingency.22 9
In Missouri, because the concept of marital property pertains only
to the time of divorce and not at all to transactions during the ongoing
marriage, we squarely face the issue whether the parties' contract for
classification of the property for purposes of divorce only should be rec-
ognized as a "valid agreement." Of course, an antenuptial agreement
could provide for waiver of inheritance and election rights at death with
added provisions for classification at divorce.2 30 Missouri seems to have
no cases prior to the new divorce act on the validity of contracts provid-
ing for property disposition at divorce, so the courts will be free to con-
sider the wisdom of approving such contracts without the restraints of
stare decisis.2 31 The only language in the new statute which may suggest
222. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 132, at 334.
223. Id.
224. W. REPPY & W. DE FUNIAV, supra note 185, at 410.
225. Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
226. Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973).
227. Reiling v. Reiling, 1 Or. App. 571, 463 P.2d 591 (1970). The decisions
were prompted by fears of collusion and easing the path to divorce.
228. Unander v. Unander, 264 Or. 464, 506 P.2d 719 (1973); Klarman, Mari-
tal Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397 (1977).
229. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
230. See Mo. Bar C.L.E., Missouri Family Law ch. 3 (1976). The author equates
a spouse's contractual waiver of the right to claim at dissolution that property is
marital to waiver of inheritance and election rights at death.
231. In two cases Missouri courts have held that while the parties are living
together contracts for separation and settlement of property are against public
[Vol. 43196
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a negative legislative intent is in the section dealing with "separation
agreements"; "To promote the amicable settlement of disputes between
the parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution
of their marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation agree-
ment .... "232
Not only is the meaning of "valid agreement" important in regard to
antenuptial agreements, but Conrad makes it pertinent to transactions
during marriage.2 33  If joint titling can convert separate property to
marital property because it indicates an intent to transmute in the ab-
sence of countervailing evidence, then it would seem that any written
contract between the parties could evidence the intent to transmute
separate property to marital property or vice versa. Those Missouri cases
which have already recognized intent as a basis for characterizing prop-
erty as separate or marital actually have answered the policy argument
about "valid agreement." It would seem that if documents or commin-
gling attributable to one party can determine what property is divisible
at divorce, then a written contract between both of the parties should be
able to do so. The validity issue in such case should be similar to that in
the waiver of rights at death agreements: fairness and full disclosure. 34
Freedom to contract regarding the nature of the property in advance of
marriage or at the time property is acquired during marriage would en-
courage preplanning and would encourage the use of attorneys in the
more productive role of prevention than in the role of scavenger over
the broken pieces of marriage.
CONCLUSION
The first round of appellate interpretations of the property division
section of the Missouri marriage dissolution act is near to ending. The
strange beast of marital property is sufficiently tamed to be used with
confidence in the average dissolution. All tangible assets, including the
proceeds of personal injury claims, and enforceable intangible interests,
such as vested contract rights, are all to be included as property. All
property acquired during marriage, unless within a statutory exception
and not "transmuted" to separate property, is marital. Acquisition occurs
at the time title is received, so that property titled in one spouse prior to
policy. Harrison v. Harrison, 201 Mo. App. 465, 211 S.W. 708 (K.C. Ct. App.
1919); Speiser v. Speiser, 188 Mo. App. 328, 175 S.W. 122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
The reason given was that they have a tendency to promote separation and di-
vorce. In the Harrison opinion the court stated in dicta: "There, of course, may
be a valid settlement of property between husband and wife without a separa-
tion," 201 Mo. App. at 468, 211 S.W. at 709.
232. § 452.325.1, RSMo (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
233. See text accompanying note 191 supra.
234. See First Nat'l Bank v. Jacques, 470 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1971); Youngblood
v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
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marriage remains separate with the probability that reimbursement for
marital funds and effort spent on it may be enforced. The court must
divide marital property; it has wide powers and discretion in the manner
of division.
The second round of appellate decisions will reveal the depth and
sophistication of the courts' acceptance of the partnership theory of
marriage. If the fruits of all efforts of each spouse are, indeed, to bene-
fit the family created by the marriage, then all interests of value,
whether contingent (nonvested retirement benefits), nonassignable (per-
sonal injury cause of action), unmarketable (goodwill of a professional
practice), or cloaked in separate title (increased value of prior owned
close corporation or realty), developed by the efforts of either spouse
during the marriage should be subject to the discretionary division of
the trial court. Likewise, if the property aspects of marriage are to be
treated as the interests of a partnership endeavor rather than of a status
rigidly defined by law, then all fair agreements between the spouses for
classification of their property should be honored. The fullest recogni-
tion of marriage as a partnership can be achieved by including all value
created by the spouses' efforts as marital property and then by allowing
the parties full freedom to determine privately who is entitled to that
value.
235
235. See Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffec-
tive and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974).
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